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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Klaus Nico Gomez-Alas appeals from his convictions for battery and infamous

crime against nature.

Statement

Of The

The

state

And Course Of The Proceedings

Facts

Gomez

charged

against nature. (R., pp. 109-10.)

“plac[ed] his

mouth upon

the Victim. (R., p. 110.)

With one count of rape and one count 0f infamous crime

The infamous crime against nature charge alleged Gomez

the vagina” of the Victim 0r “plac[ed] his penis in the

The case proceeded

t0 a jury trial.

(R., pp.

mouth” of

373-76, 410-1

1,

422-

5 1 .)

At
at

the evidence

showed

that the Victim

went with

friends to a Christmas party

a local bar after she got off work in the Sun Valley ice cream shop 0n Christmas Eve.

(TL, V01.
L. 13.)

sick,

9

trial

—

537, L. 2 —p. 539, L. 10; p. 681, L. 7

1, p.

With

unlocked.

Gomez on top

later to

his penis. (TL, V01.

her.

left

698, L. 23; p. 755, L. 14

awoke

(TL, V01.

1, p.

1, p.

— p.

(T12, V01. 1, p.

561, L. 23

—

L. 8

— p. 568,

L. 9.)

dorm

8; p.

— p. 564,

[her]

L. 21.)

p. 566, L. 7.)

752, L. 20 —p. 755,

after drinking

— p.

767, L. 22; V01. 2, p. 864, L. 11

of her and “[p]ain in

564, L. 22

566, Ls. 5-7.)

1, p.

682, L.

539, L. 11

and getting

561, L. 22; p. 682, L.

—

p. 868, L. 10.)

When

She

vagina” from “[p]enetration” with

Gomez then performed oral

penetrate [her] vagina at that point” she answered, “I

V01.

p.

the help 0f friends, the Victim returned to her

and her door was

p.

—

asked whether she

felt that it

He then forced her t0 perform oral

was being

felt

sex upon

“anything

licked.”

sex on him. (TL, V01.

1, p.

(Tr.,

566,

Earlier in the evening a security guard at the women’s dorm found Gomez trying
to get into one of the dorm rooms. (Tr., vol. 2, p. 835, L. 6 – p. 836, L. 13.) When told to
leave the women’s dorm, Gomez stated twice that “if it was unlocked, it meant that she
wanted it.” (Tr., vol. 2, p. 836, L., 14 – p. 837, L. 7.)
In an interview with police Gomez admitted performing oral sex on the victim,
stating specifically that he licked her clitoris. (State’s Exhibit 15.)
The jury acquitted Gomez of rape and battery with intent to commit rape on the
first count, but convicted him of battery. (R., pp. 484-85.) The jury also convicted Gomez
of infamous crime against nature for penetrating the victim’s vagina with his tongue. (R.,
p. 485.)
Gomez filed a motion for a new trial contending that during trial the district court
had given an improper dynamite instruction. (R., pp. 510-516.) He also moved for a
judgment of acquittal contending there was insufficient evidence of the element of
penetration. (R., pp. 517-22.) The district court denied both motions. (R., pp. 553-77.)
The district court imposed a sentence of six years with four years determinate for
infamous crime against nature and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 609-15.) Gomez filed a
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 616-22.)
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ISSUES

Gomez
I.

states the issues

Did the

0n appeal

as:

district court err in

concluding that the act 0f cunnilingus

constitutes an infamous crime against nature Within the

Idaho Code §§ 18-6605
II.

III.

&

meaning of

18-6606?

Was the evidence sufﬁcient to support Mr. Gomez’s conviction
where there was no evidence that his tongue penetrated [the
Victim’s] vaginal opening and no evidence that the act he performed
was against [the Victim’s] Will?
Did

the district court err in providing the jury With a dynamite

it indicated it could not reach a unanimous decision
on the charge of infamous crime against nature?

instruction after

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Gomez

show

failed to

that his conduct underlying his conviction

was outside

the scope of the statute?

2.

Has Gomez

failed t0

show the evidence presented at trial was insufﬁcient t0 support

his conviction for the

3.

Has Gomez
instruction?

infamous crime against nature?

failed t0

show

that the district court

gave an improper dynamite

ARGUMENT
I.

Gomez Has

A.

Failed

T0 Show That His Conduct Underlying His Conviction Was Outside
The Scope Of The Statute

Introduction

The jury convicted Gomez 0f infamous crime against nature
sex on the Victim against her Will. (R., p. 485.)
constitute the infamous crime against nature.

Gomez

for performing oral

conduct does not

asserts that his

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.) Application

0f the relevant legal standards shows his argument to be Without merit.

B.

Standard

“We

Of Review

exercise free review over statutory interpretation because

law.” State V. Owens, 158 Idaho

C.

1, 3,

it is

a question 0f

343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015).

The Infamous Crime Against Nature Includes Forced Oral Sex
The Idaho Code criminalizes “the infamous crime against nature.” LC.

The language 0f the

statute “clearly

to limit prosecutions t0 the

shows

that

it

was not

the intention of the Legislature

crime of sodomy and to omit the inhibition and punishment of

other infamous crimes against nature.” State V. Altwatter, 29 Idaho 107,

257 (1916). The

§ 18-6605.

statute is “sufﬁciently

_,

157 P. 256,

broad to include not only the crime 0f sodomy, but

also all unnatural carnal copulations.” Li.

The infamous crime against nature thus includes

carnal copulation completed “per os” (by the mouth). Li. at

_, 157 P.

at

256.

In State V. Maland, 124 Idaho 830, 864 P.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1993), the defendant

asserted that the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not establish probable cause t0

charge him With infamous crime against nature because the Victim “testiﬁed only that

Maland had performed
state failed to establish

on

oral sex

her, not that

he had penetrated her, and therefore the

an essential element ofthe claim.”

Li. at 832,

864 P.2d

Idaho Court 0f Appeals concluded that because the evidence presented
the element of penetration, and

evidence

m1

at the

is

Maland had not claimed

at

at trial

670.

The

supported

otherwise, any failure 0f lack 0f

preliminary hearing was not reviewable. Li. The upshot of Altwatter and

that oral sex,

both

fellatio

and cunnilingus,

falls

Within the prohibition against

the infamous crime against nature.

This same result has been reached by other courts interpreting statutes criminalizing

crimes against nature. In State

Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 3 14, 317-18 (M0. 1972), the court

V.

stated that the crime against nature

“embraces sodomy proper,

bestiality,

buggary,

fellatio,

“The same reasoning

(oral genital contact)

and cunnilingus

would include

Within the ‘crime against nature’ impels us t0 interpret the phrase as

fellatio

including cunnilingus.”

State V.

(oral vaginal contact).”

Townsend, 71 A.2d 517, 518 (Me. 1950). Similarly,

Rose V. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), the Supreme Court 0fthe United
that the petitioner, convicted in

notice that cunnilingus

that

in

States rej ected a claim

Tennessee of the infamous crime against nature, lacked

was a prohibited

act.

“Anyone who cared

to

do so could certainly

determine What particular acts have been considered crimes against nature, and there can

be n0 contention that the respondent’s acts were ones never before considered as such.”

Li

at

50 (citing cases).
In arguing that Idaho’s crime against nature does not include oral sex performed

a

woman, but only

relies

oral sex

performed on a man,

0n the reasoning of People

legislature, in criminalizing the

V.

Gomez

tries to distinguish

Smith, 101 N.E. 957

(Ill.

m1

on

and

1913), to argue that the

infamous crime against nature, must have believed “that

the crime

argument

must involve the male sexual organ.”
is

Without merit.

First,

as

above, the Idaho statute encompasses “all unnatural carnal

stated

copulations.” Altwatter, 29 Idaho at

_,

facts 0f Altwatter are limited to fellatio,

proper reading of
that

This

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.)

m1.

because Maland was

157 P.

its

holding

257 (emphasis added). Although the
is not.

This context also informs the

In that case thefacts involved cunnilingus and the holding

fairly tried for the

Gomez

is

was

infamous crime against nature his claim of

m,

was not cognizable.

insufﬁcient evidence at the preliminary hearing

832, 864 P.2d at 670.

at

correct that the

Maland court did not

124 Idaho

directly address

whether cunnilingus was within the scope of the infamous crime against nature, but
analysis and holding cannot be squared with

Supreme Court of Maine reasoned, there

is

Gomez’s argument

n0 reasonable

being used for sexual intercourse in one context

Townsend, 71 A.2d

at 5

1

(fellatio)

distinction

involved.” 101 N.E. at 958.

As pointed

we have knowledge,

out above,

it is

by

t0

As

the

between the mouth

the

all

the

the cases in

Which

male sexual organ was

not true that n0 convictions for the

infamous crime against nature involved cunnilingus. In

(“Anyone Who cared

not.

8.

convictions have been sustained 0f which

rejected

it is

its

but not in another (cunnilingus).

Second, the reasoning 0f the court in Sm_ith was, “In

was expressly

that

at

fact, this

Supreme Court 0f the United

States.

very type 0f reasoning
Locke, 423 U.S.

do so could certainly determine what particular

acts

at

50

have been

considered crimes against nature, and there can be n0 contention that the respondent’s acts

were ones never before considered as such”).

The

district court

concluded that cunnilingus,

like other

(E R.,

included in the scope 0f the infamous crime against nature.

conclusion

is

This

p. 564, n.3.)

supported by cases in both Idaho and otherjurisdictions. Gomez’s arguments

that only certain

failed t0

forms of oral sex, are

show

forms of oral sex are included in the

error in the denial 0f his

motion for

Gomez

statute is unpersuasive.

on

acquittal

has

this basis.

II.

Gomez Has

Failed

To Show The Evidence Presented At

Trial

Was

Insufﬁcient

T0

Support His Conviction For The Infamous Crime Against Nature

A.

Introduction

The

As

district court

to the requirement

as t0

and

found sufﬁcient evidence to support the verdict.

of penetration, the

what had to be penetrated, with the

Gomez

arguing

it

had

t0

that issue, the district court

(R., pp. 566-67.)

(R., pp. 565-76.)

district court ﬁrst

noted that the parties differed

was

the female genitalia generally

state

arguing

be the vaginal opening.

it

(R., pp. 565-66.)

Without resolving

found the evidence supported a ﬁnding of penetrating

In so concluding, the district court relied

either.

0n the Victim’s testimony, the

defendant’s testimony, the expert testimony, and the physical evidence. (R., pp. 565-67.)

Gomez

argues the district court erred because “evidence 0f licking

0f penetration.” (Appellant’s

brief, pp. 14-17.)

Gomez’s argument

law, the relevant evidence, and basic principles of logic.

vacuum prove
ﬁnding

that

As

penetration,

it

genitalia

t0 the requirement that the sexual act

ﬁrst concluded the state

pp. 567-72.)

The

district court

on the applicable
in a

The evidence supports a

and her vagina when he licked

must not be consensual, the

was not required t0 prove

not evidence

Although licking does not

does not disprove penetration.

Gomez penetrated the Victim’s

fails

is

her.

district court

“force, Violence, duress 0r threats.” (R.,

then found the evidence of the Victim’s intoxication and

that the defendant entered her

room without permission while

performing sexual acts on her showed
does not challenge the

district court’s

was non-consensual, but contends

it

was

against her will.

she slept and began

(R., pp. 572-76.)

Gomez

conclusion that the evidence shows the sexual contact

the court erred

by not

requiring evidence showing he

“used force 0r Violence, duress, or threats 0f immediate and great bodily harm,

accompanied by apparent power 0f execution.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-21.)

This

argument, that the Court should engraft part of a different criminal statute into the charging
statute

Where

it

does not appear,

Standard

B.

is

Without legal merit.

Of Review

“In assessing the sufﬁciency 0f evidence,
entered

trier

upon a jury

verdict so long as there

is

we Will uphold a judgment of conviction

substantial evidence

0f fact could conclude that the prosecution proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(internal quotation omitted).

all essential

State V. Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 417,

The Court “must View

evidence, including the evidence offered

by

Li.

rational

elements of the crime

299 P.3d 219, 224 (2013)

the evidence in the light

favorable” to upholding the jury verdict and Will not substitute

of weight, credibility or reasonable inferences.

upon which a

its

own judgment 0n issues

The Court reviews

the defendant.”

most

“all

of the

trial

State V. Cortez, 135 Idaho

561, 563, 21 P.3d 498, 500 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

The Evidence Supports The Verdict

Where
his conviction

a criminal defendant challenges the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence supporting

on appeal, the “relevant inquiry

is

not whether this Court would

ﬁnd

the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but Whether after Viewing the evidence in the

light

most favorable

essential elements

to the prosecution,

any rational

0f fact could have found the

trier

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State

542, 546, 348 P.3d 157, 161 (2015) (emphasis original).

Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002) (evidence

is

E

V. Eliasen,

also State V.

158 Idaho

Young, 138

m

sufﬁcient if “any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements 0f the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”);

DLiels, 134 Idaho 896, 898, 11 P.3d 1114, 1116 (2000) (verdict reviewed for substantial
evidence upon which “any rational

trier

of fact” could have found

guilt (internal quotations

omitted». If there are multiple possible bases for supporting a general verdict “the inquiry

on appeal becomes Whether there was sufﬁcient evidence
0f conviction.” Cortez, 135 Idaho

at

0f the evidence in favor of upholding the

all

verdict.” State V. Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818, 87 P.3d 302,

awakened

to

in this case

shows

ﬁnd Gomez had broken

her, including the prohibited act

305

into her

App. 2003).

from drinking and

room and was performing

of cunnilingus. (Supra, pp.

The Evidence Supports

(Ct.

that the Victim passed out

both a ﬁnding that there was penetration and

1.

uphold any one 0f the bases

564, 21 P.3d at 501. In reviewing the sufﬁciency of

the evidence, “this Court Will construe

The evidence

t0

it

was

1-2.)

sexual acts upon

This evidence supports

against the Victim’s will.

A Finding Of Penetration

Completion of the crime of infamous crime against nature requires “[a]ny sexual
penetration,

however

slight.”

genitalia inside the labia

LC.

§ 18-6606.

majora requires a “sexual penetration,” the verdict

supported by both the Victim’s testimony that
that

he licked her

clitoris.

Because licking any part 0f the Victim’s

Gomez

is

amply

licked her vagina and his admission

This analysis

supported by the analysis and holding of State

is

V. Brashier,

127

Idaho 730, 905 P.2d 1039 (Ct. App. 1995). In that case the defendant “attempted t0 push
his penis into the Victim’s

penetrated only her

was sufﬁcient
Just as

to

t0

lips.

show

mouth,” but because the Victim kept her mouth closed he

Li. at 732,

905 P.2d

at

1041 (emphasis added).

a sexual penetration. Li. at 733, 905 P.2d at 1042.

Bthier did not need to

accomplish a sexual penetration,

succeed in getting his penis into the Victim’s mouth

Gomez

did not need to succeed in getting his tongue

inside the Victim’s vagina to accomplish “[a]ny sexual penetration,

his tongue passed the outer areas 0f the Victim’s genitals

penetration.

p. 182).)

(E, gg,

He was

Tr., V01. 2, p.

1319, L. 24

little

unclear

— p. 1428,

however

slight.”

Once

he accomplished a sexual

L. 7; State’s Exhibit 18 (Bates

thus guilty of the crime if the jury accepted the Victim’s testimony 0r his

admission to having licked the Victim’s

Gomez

This evidence

clitoris.

argues the evidence must

how

the

show he penetrated

the Victim’s vagina, but

requirement of vaginal penetration arises from the

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-17.)

As noted

is

a

statute.

above, the statute requires “sexual penetration,”

which could be accomplished with or without speciﬁc penetration of the Victim’s vagina.

Even

if

vaginal penetration were a required element of the crime, the evidence

supports such a ﬁnding.

your vagina

at that

The prosecutor asked the Victim, “Did you feel anything penetrate

point?”

(TL, V01.

testiﬁed in response, “I felt that

that “it

it

1, p.

566, Ls. 5-6 (emphasis added).)

was being licked.”

(T12, V01. 1, p.

was being licked” was an afﬁrmative response

penetration.

566, L. 7.)

The Victim
The answer

t0 the prosecutor’s question about

The Victim’s testimony was evidence of penetration of her vagina.

10

In arguing t0 the contrary,

Gomez

claims the evidence shows only that she was

licked “at her vagina.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) This

was not the Victim’s testimony. At

n0 point did she say she was licked “at” her vagina. Her answer
she

felt

vagina.

penetration of her vagina

Simply

stated,

When

was not a

t0 the question

Whether

was only

“at” her

denial because the licking

the Victim testiﬁed

Gomez

licked her vagina in response t0

the question of Whether she felt penetration 0f her vagina she testiﬁed there

penetration.

The

The

state

act

verdict

had

t0

is

supported by the evidence.

prove only “sexual penetration,” Which

0f cunnilingus Whether performed 0n the vagina 0r the

prove vaginal penetration,
for either such ﬁnding.

was

it

had

Gomez

to

prove

it

“however

show

has failed t0

it

clitoris.

slight.”

did

when

Even

it

proved the

if the state

had

t0

The evidence was sufﬁcient

that the verdict is

unsupported by the

record.

Substantial Evidence Supports

2.

The Finding That The Oral Sex Was Not

Consensual

The relevant

statute provides that “[e]very

person

who

is

guilty 0f the infamous

crime against nature, committed with mankind 0r with any animal,
§ 18-6605.

In this language, as written, there

There

is,

is

no element

is

punishable.”

LC.

relating to consent.

however, a constitutional prohibition against criminalizing the private

sexual conduct of two adults, undertaken “With full and mutual consent from each other.”

Lawrence

V.

Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). “However, Lawrence makes clear that this

constitutional protection does not apply to nonconsensual sexual acts, including sex with

those incapable of consenting.” State V. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 3 14, 324 P.3d 1006, 1013

(Ct.

App. 2014).

interest

Indeed, “the holding in Lawrence does not affect a state’s legitimate

and indeed, duty, to interpose when consent

11

is

in doubt.” State V.

Cook, 146 Idaho

261, 262, 192 P.3d 1085, 1086 (Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
Co_ok, there

was n0 consent and

the infamous crime against nature statute

Thus, in

was properly

applied t0 oral sex 0n a vulnerable adult. Li.

Here the

district court

properly concluded the state was not required t0 prove “force,

Violence, duress or threats.”

(R., pp. 567-72.)

The

district court

then concluded the

evidence that the Victim was intoxicated and that Gomez, a stranger to the Victim, entered
her

room without permission and

believe she

deemed

was consenting

started

performing oral sex on her without any reason to

(other than the fact her door

was unlocked, a

fact

sufﬁcient). (R., pp. 572-76.)

On

appeal

Gomez

does not challenge the

district court’s

determination that the

evidence was sufﬁcient t0 show the Victim did not consent t0 the act of oral sex
inﬂicted

to

Gomez

upon

her.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-21.)

prove more than mere lack of consent.

As

(Id.)

He

Gomez

argues, however, that the state

This argument

stated above, the constitutional standard is that

prosecute an individual for a sexual act performed “withfull

it

is

had

without merit.

violates equal protection t0

and mutual consentfrom each

other.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).

Gomez

0f the requirement that the

equal protection and concedes that

the prosecution

Gomez

met

state

prove lack of consent

this standard.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 17-19 (citing R., pp. 520-21).)

argues, however, that the evidence

as provided in I.C. § 18-6608(1).

is

recognizes that the source

must

establish force, Violence, duress 0r threats,

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-21.) That statute sets out the

ways that a defendant may accomplish the crime of forcible sexual penetration “against the
will” of the Victim.

LC.

§

18-66080). Nothing, however, suggests that

this statute is a

constitutional standard applicable t0 the infamous crime against nature generally or this

12

case speciﬁcally.

§

18-6608

is

Gomez has failed to show error in the district court’s

conclusion that I.C.

a legislative deﬁnition 0f an element of a different crime and does not

deﬁne

the constitutional equal protection standard, and thus does not control the state’s proof

requirements.
In order t0 establish that the prosecution of

Gomez

did not Violate his equal

protection rights the state had to establish that the sex act in question

with the “full and mutual consent” 0f the Victim. The
failed t0

show

that

it

state

was not performed

met this burden and Gomez has

had a higher, unmet burden.

III.

Gomez Has

Failed

To Show That The

District

Court Gave

An Improper Dynamite

Instruction

A.

Introduction

The

district court rejected

instruction” because “[t]here

not instruct the jury that
“coercive.”

it

is

had

(R., pp. 561-62.)

dynamite instruction.

Gomez’s claim

n0 evidence

it

had given an improper “dynamite

that the jury

to continue deliberating,”

On

appeal

(R., pp. 23-28.)

Gomez

Gomez has

dynamite instruction the court’s comments were

B.

is

and

that

its

the “Court did

comments were not

argues that the district court did give a

show

error because the district

Gomez

argues that even if not a

failed t0

court did not give a dynamite instruction. Alternatively,

This argument

was deadlocked,”

still

coercive because they misled the jury.

not preserved.

Standard

Of Review

Idaho’s

appellate

courts

freely

review “whether a jury was

instructions.” State V. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710,

13

given proper

215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009).

Gomez Has

C.

Failed

To Show The

District Court

Gave An Improper Dynamite

Instruction

“A dynamite

instruction

is

one that directs a deadlocked jury

deliberating and exhorts those jurors holding a minority

Gomez, 137 Idaho 671, 676, 52 P.3d 315, 320 (2002)

State V.

An

View

instruction to

keep deliberating

t0 reconsider their position.”

(internal quotations omitted).

not a prohibited dynamite instruction if

is

continue

t0

“did not

it

pressure the jury t0 reach a unanimous verdict nor suggest that minority jurors reconsider
their positions.”

2005).

Timmons, 141 Idaho 376, 378, 109 P.3d 1118, 1120

State V.

E m,
alﬂ

that “did not direct

137 Idaho

any jurors

t0

at

(Ct.

App.

676, 52 P.3d at 320 (instruction to keep deliberating

change

their

minds or attempt

to coerce a verdict”

was not

prohibited dynamite instruction); State V. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 586, 990 P.2d 742,

752

(Ct.

App. 1999) (comment that jurors would keep deliberating not dynamite instruction

Where jury not deadlocked and comment did not pressure jurors
“[I]n prohibiting the use

t0 reevaluate their stances).

of dynamite instructions, the Supreme Court speciﬁcally

disclaimed any intent to prohibit instructions directing further deliberations where the jury
is

not deﬁnitely deadlocked.”

Ramsey

V. State,

159 Idaho 887, 367 P.3d 71

1,

719

(Ct.

App. 20 1 5).
In this case neither of the elements of an improper dynamite instruction

because the jury was not deﬁnitely deadlocked and the
to reconsider their decisions.

-Rape Not Guilty. A11 of us 12

NG.

2 G.

-20.3 Guilty 12/0

-20.4 8

G 4 NG

14

present

did not exhort jurors

During deliberations the jury provided a note

20.1

-20.2 10

district court

is

that stated:

(Exhibits, p. 5;

ﬂ

Tr., V01. 2, p.

— p. 1503,

1502, L. 21

correspond With the elements instructions.

counsel} the

district court

— p.

The numbers, 20.1

if the

it’s

1508, L. 12; Exhibits, p. 6.) The jury answered that

— p.

it

Count

14; R., p. 554.)

(the

II

The

infamous crime against nature) blank. (TL,

district court

(Tr., V01. 2, p.

Wished

t0 continue

1509, L. 3; Exhibits, p. 6.) The jury thereafter

returned a verdict of guilty 0n battery as an included offense on Count

related to

a status report” and

jury wished t0 continue deliberating.

deliberating. (TL, V01. 2, p. 1508, L. 18

et seq.,

After consulting with

(R., pp. 466-71.)

concluded the note was “not a question,

responded with a note asking
1503, L. 18

L. 17.)

I,

but

it

left

the part

V01. 2, p. 1510, Ls. 8-

then instructed the jury:

where—the time and

The way this
reads—the way I intended it—I don’t know if it read this way to you—is
that you 100k at Count—there are two counts. You looked at Count I. You
dealt with that. You dealt with the lesser included offenses for Count I, but
this does not show What your verdict is for Count II, the infamous crime
against nature. And I don’t know—you know, of course, I’m not in there,
so I don’t know what happened there. I don’t know. But I would ask that
you go back and Visit that count. We need t0 have a decision on Count II.
That’s 0n the second page under Count II.
I

appreciate

effort

you’ve put into

it.

Iwant to be clear that this is—when I say you need to 100k at it, please talk.
I don’t want you to feel any pressure. Do What you need t0 d0. Review it.
You returned a verdict on one count and the lesser included. We need the
other—we need you to evaluate the other count.
I

know

Let

me

D0 you Wish to

it’s late.

tell

you

this.

continue 0r not and

would

like

you

let

continue?

You can go back there and decide if you want t0
me know. But I want you guys to decide, but we—I

to consider

Count

II.

Okay.

Thank you very much.

1

Gomez’ counsel

0n the basis ofthe

stated that

it

would be improper

t0

“presume” the jury was deadlocked

note. (Tr., V01. 2, p. 1506, Ls. 9-19.)

15

—

(TL, V01. 2, p. 1510, L. 15
district court

it

0n

this

p.

151

1,

L. 19 (break for

bench conference omitted).) The

record properly concluded that the jury was not deadlocked and that

did not direct any jurors to change their minds.
In arguing otherwise

Gomez

points out that the district court did not p011 the jury,

did not “guide” the jury on further deliberation, and “instructed the jury, ‘we need you t0
evaluate the other count.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 27 (quoting TL, V01. 2, p. 151

1,

Ls. 12-

These portions of the record, he asserts relying on a concurring opinion by a single

13).)

Court 0f Appeals judge, created the “risk” of a “coercive effect 0n minority jurors.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-28.) This argument fails on both the law and the facts.

First,

forth a

with

all

due respect

to

Judge Melanson, the Idaho Supreme Court has put

two element deﬁnition 0f a prohibited dynamite

(1) “directs a

instruction:

an instruction that

deadlocked jury t0 continue deliberating” and (2) “exhorts those jurors

holding a minority View to reconsider their position.”

m,

137 Idaho

at

676, 52 P.3d

A mere instruction to a non-deadlocked jury to keep deliberating is not improper

at 320.

so long as

it

does not “direct any jurors to change their minds” and does not “attempt to

coerce a verdict.”

Li.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 27),

The mere
is

“risk” 0f a “coercive effect

by

the Idaho

Supreme Court. Gomez, 137 Idaho

proposed legal standard

is

on minority jurors”

not the proper legal standard. Indeed, any instruction to keep

deliberating after an initial divided vote runs that “risk,” yet such

error

it is

at

was

explicitly rej ected as

676, 52 P.3d at 320.

Gomez’s

incompatible With the standard established by the Idaho

Supreme Court.
Second, the record does not factually support the claim 0f a “risk” of coercion that

shows

error

by the

district court.

The jurors were

16

instructed t0 “[c]onsult With” each other,

“[c]0nsider each other’s Views,” and “deliberate with the objective of reaching an

agreement,” but were not t0 “disturb[]” their “individual judgment,” were t0 “decide this
case” for themselves, and were not t0 “surrender” an “honest opinion as to the weight or

effect

0f the evidence” or the “innocence” 0f the defendant “because the majority 0f the

jury feels otherwise or for the purpose ofreturning a unanimous verdict.” (R., p. 477.) The
jury must be presumed to have followed this instruction.

443 P.3d 129, 136 (2019).
effectively rescinded 0r

The record

countermanded

State V. Miller, 165 Idaho 115,

in this case does not

show

that the district court

an opinion the defendant was

this instruction that

innocent was not t0 be abandoned merely for the purpose 0f achieving a verdict.

The

initial

note provided during deliberations showed that the jurors were divided

0n two counts, speciﬁcally the infamous crime against nature and the included offense 0f
battery With intent to

L. 17.)

it

Wished

Exhibits p. 6.)

(Tr., V01. 2, p.

ﬂ

Tr., V01. 2, p.

The jury answered

commit

and

(Tr., V01. 2, p.

as an included offense, but

(Tr., V01. 2, p.

requested the jury to “consider Count

know Whether they Wished t0

1503, L. 18

—

p.

1508, L. 12;

—

p.

n0 verdict on the

1510, Ls. 8-14; R., p. 554.)

II,” also

requested they

let

(Tr., V01. 2, p.

17

151

1,

Ls. 14-19.)

The

the court

“continue” deliberations, and instructed the jurors that

not “want [them] to feel any pressure.”

1509,

not guilty verdict 0n rape and battery With intent

on battery

infamous crime against nature charge.
district court

1503,

deadlocked on the

in the afﬁrmative (TL, V01. 2, p. 1508, L. 18

later returned a

rape, a guilty verdict

— p.

1502, L. 21

1506, Ls. 9-19.) The district court agreed and asked the

to continue deliberating.

L. 3; Exhibits p. 6),

to

(Exhibits, p. 5;

Gomez asserted it would be improper to “presume” the jury was

basis 0f the note.

jury if

commit rape.

it

did

The record as a whole does not support the claim that the district court gave a
dynamite instruction that coerced minority-view jurors to abandon their individual
judgment. Gomez claims, without citation, that the jury “declared to the court it could not
reach a unanimous decision.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 27.) This is not true. The initial note
carried the notation “8 G 4 NG” in relation to the infamous crime against nature charge.
(Exhibits, p. 5.) The note does not state that the jury cannot reach a unanimous decision.
Gomez’ trial counsel argued it would be improper to “presume” the jury was deadlocked
on the basis of the note. (Tr., vol. 2, p. 1506, Ls. 9-19.) No other evidence of deadlock
exists in the record. Moreover the district court twice inquired of the jury whether it wished
to continue deliberating. (Exhibits, p. 6; Tr., vol. 2, p. 1511, Ls. 114-16.) The first time
the jury affirmatively responded that it would continue to deliberate (Exhibits, p. 6), and
the second time it did not respond other than to provide a verdict on Count II. At no point
did the jury “declare[] to the court it could not reach a unanimous decision.” Gomez has
failed to show the jury was deadlocked, the first requirement of an improper dynamite
instruction.
Gomez has also failed to show the second element, that the district court exhorted
those jurors holding a minority view to reconsider their position. Gomez claims the district
court did not poll the individual jurors. (Appellant’s brief, p. 27.) Such polling was an
option, but Gomez has failed to argue or show how polling or not polling is relevant to the
question of whether the district court gave an improper dynamite instruction. Next Gomez
argues the district court did not “guide” the jury to further deliberations. (Appellant’s brief,
p. 27.) Again, this argument is irrelevant. Gomez also points out that “there was no line
for the jury to check in order to indicate it could not reach a unanimous verdict.”

18

(Appellant’s brief, p. 27.)

Although

it

is

theoretically possible that a verdict

specifying “hung jury” as an option has been used

show that using

failed t0

Which

a standard verdict form

you

to “evaluate” a count is the equivalent

Second, the line

their opinions.

inviting the jury t0 decide if it

the jurors to “feel

Finally,

instructions

any pressure.”

instruction

Gomez makes, which

such argument

is

time,

is

Gomez
more

likely.

that the district

(Appellant’s brief,

apparent, that asking the jury

0f coercing jurors in a deadlocked jury to reconsider

to continue deliberations

(Tr., V01. 2, p.

151

and

stating

it

did not Wish

Ls. 8-19.)

1,

Gomez argues that even if not a prohibited dynamite instruction the court’s

“may have misled

show that this

the jury to believe

issue

is

Gomez, 137 Idaho

preserved or that

it is

it

had

at

t0 reach a verdict

677, 52 P.3d at 321).)

fundamental

error.

on Count

Gomez

150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Even ifpreserved,

difﬁcult to see, and

Gomez

offers us

n0

insight here,

how

could have convinced the jury in this case either that a
error in

Gomez)

district court

0r that the jury

was being compelled

it is

the district court’s

new

trial

way

t0

any time merely by informing the court

deliberating. (T12, V01. 2, p. 151

1,

Ls. 14-18.)

19

that

it

m

comments

would not happen

(the

The

end deliberations was

reach a verdict. Rather, the district court speciﬁcally instructed the jury that
deliberations at

has

extremely

to reach a verdict in this case.

did not impress upon the jury that the only

II.

“Idaho’s appellate

courts Will not consider error not preserved for appeal through an obj ection at trial.”

m,

has

taken out of context, Which context includes the court

wished

(Appellant’s brief, p. 28 (citing

failed t0

is

some

t0 evaluate the other count.’”

Gomez does not argue, and n0

p. 27.) First,

at

makes a dynamite

leaves the only relevant argument

court “instructed the jury, ‘we need

somewhere

form

it

t0

could end

did not wish to continue

Gomez’s argument
and reviewing the

fails

entire record

was not deadlocked and the

on the law and the

shows the

facts.

Under relevant

district court correctly

legal standards

concluded that the jury

court did not coerce jurors into reconsidering their opinions.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to afﬁrm the judgment ofthe district court.

DATED this 27th day 0f December, 2019.
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